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1The Globalisation of Re-sentment: Failure, Denial and Violence in World Politics (*)
Elisabetta Brighi, University of Westminster
[e.brighi@westminster.ac.uk]
Let's kill him boldly, but not wrathfully;
Let's carve him as a dish fit for the gods,
Not hew him as a carcass fit for hounds:
And let our hearts, as subtle masters do,
Stir up their servants to an act of rage,
And after seem to chide 'em. This shall make
Our purpose necessary and not envious:
Which so appearing to the common eyes,
We shall be call'd purgers, not murderers.
W. Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act II, Scene I
It is commonplace for pop psychology today to invite their readers to embrace, rather than 
resist, failure. Invoking a supposedly timeless wisdom that stretches from Confucius to 
Sylvester Stallone, self-help magazines such as ‘Psychology Today’ urge readers to cease 
looking at failure as one looks at an unappealing birthday present and start welcoming failure 
as a gift, disappointment as a growth opportunity, and defeat as a path leading to complete 
mastery of the resilient self.1 A good dose of denial, disavowal and effacement is normally 
involved in a process often presented as therapeutic ‘quick fix’. While the unresolved 
feelings or incongruent actions that may have precipitated failure are mostly left 
unscrutinised, the concrete relationships in which such outcomes have emerged are glossed 
over, just as the wider social, cultural and political context becomes conveniently elided. In a 
therapeutic fantasy turned nightmare, the focus turns obsessively to the self and its expected 
ability to adapt and reconfigure towards personal success, achievement and happiness.2 
Rather than a moment of appearance and truth, generative of new possibilities and 
configurations, failure is sidestepped, managed and superseded. Its denial renders it barren.
(*) Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the ‘DPIR Research Seminar’, University of 
Westminster, 26 January 2016, at the 2015 Millennium Annual Conference on ‘Failure and Denial in 
World Politics’, London, 17-18 October, 2015 and at the 2015 EISA Conference on ‘The Worlds of 
Violence’, Giardini Naxos, 23-26 September 2015. For their insightful comments and questions, I wish 
to thank the discussants and participants, in particular Chantal Mouffe, Roberto Farneti, Bridget 
Cotter, Paulina Tambakaki, and Lauren Wilcox.
1 See Psychology Today, ‘The Gift of Failure’, available at 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/collections/201408/the-gift-failure (20 December 2015).
2 For critical commentaries on positive psychology, see Tim Dartington, ‘The therapeutic fantasy: self-
love and quick wins’, in Paul Hoggett and Sam Thompson, Politics and the Emotions (London: 
Continuum, 2012); Sam Binkley, ‘Happiness, positive psychology and the program of neoliberal 
governmentality’, Subjectivity 4 (2011): 371-394; Paul Verhaeghe, What about me? The struggle for 
identity in a market-based society (London: Scribe, 2014); and Nicole Aschoff, The New Prophets of 
Capital (London: Verso, 2014).
2Contemporary global politics is awash with failure. The failure of a liberal post-Cold War 
‘New World Order’, the failure of financial and monetary systems, the failure of climate 
change governance, the failure of the Global War on Terror, the failure of the Arab Spring, 
the failure of democratization processes, the failure of EU migration policies – the list goes 
on. On the one hand, political processes have been rendered more complex, disaggregated, 
unpredictable, prone to accidents and to the multiplication of risk – including the risk of 
failure – by globalisation.3 On the other, the inherent vulnerability of ever more complex 
political processes is often amplified tactically and capitalised upon by entrepreneurs of 
populism and managers of unease, eager to exploit failure by leveraging a politics of fear.4
Failure, after all, can trigger toxic emotions. Its occurrence breeds a host of reactive ‘red’ 
emotions such as shame, humiliation, anger and resentment that are ordinarily considered 
not only corrosive of human relationships but detrimental, on a collective and political scale, 
to civic compassion and social order.5 A tradition in modern Western political thought – from 
Grotius to Nortbert Elias – has for long attached a stigma to such emotions, considering 
them primarily as destructive forces to be contained by reason or transcended through 
charity.6 But in praising compassion over anger, tolerance over rage, the same ‘civilising’ 
tradition has also inadvertently rendered the recognition of failure more difficult, not least 
because of the emotions that come attached to it – disavowing failure when possible, 
denying it when it happens.
Failures, particularly of justice, recognition and status, however, engender emotions that are 
at the heart of the important political dynamics – from protests to social movements, from 
political violence to revolutions. In the context of the recent ‘affective turn’ in social and 
political theory and of rising popular discontent and protests across much of the globe, an 
acknowledgement has gradually formed according to which, rather than being enemies of 
3 James Der Derian, ‘Global Events, National Security, and Virtual Theory’, Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 30, n. 3 (2001): 669-690; Patricia Owens, ‘Accidents Don't Just Happen: The 
Liberal Politics of High-Technology ‘Humanitarian’ War, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 
32, no. 2 (2003), p. 595; Louise Amoore, The Politics of Possibility: Risk and Security Beyond 
Probability (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013). See also infra, fn21.
4 Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London: Routledge, 2005); Chantal Mouffe, ‘The “End of Politics” 
and the Challenge of Right-Wing Populism’, in Francisco Panizza, Populism and the Mirror of 
Democracy (London: Verso, 2005) and Didier Bigo, ‘Globalized (In)Security: The field and the Ban-
Opticon’, in Didier Bigo and A Tsoukala (eds.), Terror, Insecurity and Liberty. Illiberal practices of 
liberal regimes after 9/11 (Routledge: Abingdon, 2006), 10 - 48.
5 See, for instance, Martha Nussbaum, Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice (Harvard: 
Harvard University Press, 2013), 315. 
6 See Andrew Linklater, ‘Anger and World Politics: How Collective Emotions Shift over Time’, 
International Theory 6, no. 3 (2014): 574-78 and Andrew Linklater, The Problem of Harm in World 
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 154-231.
3political causes, negative emotions play a fundamental role in politics.7 Thus, for instance, 
anger has been recently rediscovered as ‘the essential political emotion’.8 Drawing on the 
classical Aristotelian view of anger as useful and morally justifiable affect, a number of 
scholars have thus urged to reinstate its moral and political value.9 
Closely related to anger, akin to indignation and yet also never far from rage, resentment 
has also been defined as ‘a moral feeling’ that derives from the ‘sense of being unfairly 
treated’.10 In fact, in his Theory of Moral Justice John Rawls considers resentment as both 
different from and more important than anger, as a political and moral emotion. While anger 
can arise independently of situations of injustice, resentment always invokes a concept of 
right and the existence of a moral grievance. While we may feel indignation towards the 
wrongs we perceive to have been done to others, resentment concerns wrongs that we 
perceive as our own, because directed to us.11 However, although recognising the value of 
resentment, Rawls is also quick to point out that this emotion can acquire ‘perverse and 
destructive forms’; envy can easily masquerade as resentment just as resentment can easily 
slip into rancour and bitterness –12 and turn into ressentiment.
Resentment has for long been interpreted as central to a particular mode of political action, 
namely terrorism. Annette Baier once noted that terrorism has the ‘power to make 
resentment felt’.13 Similarly, Jon Elster more recently claimed that permanent feelings of 
resentment are ‘the most relevant feature of populations’ from which terrorists, in particular 
suicide bombers, are drawn.14 Finally, Slavoj Zizek has repeatedly linked the violence of 
7 In distinguishing emotions, which entail awareness and ‘an element of information processing’, both 
from mere feelings, which are more automatic and physiological, and from affect, which is beyond 
representation, I follow the argument developed in Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchingon, ‘Theorizing 
Emotions in World Politics’, International Theory 6, no. 3 (2014): 500ff. On the affective turn, see 
Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham:  Duke University 
Press, 2002); William Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002); and John Protevi, Political Affect: Connecting the Social and the Somatic 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009). For a critique, see Ruth Leys, ‘The Turn to Affect: 
A Critique’, Critical Inquiry 37 (2011): 434-72.
8 Peter Layman, ‘The politics of anger’, Socialist Review 11 (1981): 55–74.
9 See, for instance, Mary Holmes, The Importance of Being Angry: Anger in Political Life’, European
Journal of Social Theory 7, no. 2 (2004): 123–132; Paul Muldoon, ‘The Moral Legitimacy of Anger’, 
European Journal of Social Theory 11, no, 3 (2008): 299-314; and Mary Whitebrook, ‘Love and Anger 
as Political Emotions’, in The Politics of Compassion, eds. Michael Ure and Mervyn Frost (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2014).
10 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 540.
11 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 488 and 484, respectively. Hannah Arendt’s concept of ‘moral outrage’ 
as developed in The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1951) comes 
close to this idea of resentment. A detailed comparison, however, is beyond the scope of this article. 
12 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 489 and 540.
13 Annette Baier, ‘Violent Demonstrations,’ in R.G. Frey and C.W. Morris (eds.), Violence, Terrorism, 
and Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 54.
14 Jon Elster, ‘Motivations and Beliefs in Suicide Missions’, in Making Sense of Suicide Missions, ed. 
Diego Gambetta (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 245. This naturally raises the larger 
4terrorism post-9/11 to the subjective and collective experience of resentment.15 Understood 
as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through the threat or use of violence for the 
in pursuit of political change, terrorism appears as a quintessentially affective political 
phenomenon, trading in emotions at both ends – in its motivations (resentment) and effects 
(fear).16
The political and moral value of resentment is yet to be established uncontroversially, partly 
due to the political practices it inspires, partly due to the Janus-faced nature of this emotion. 
Its ambiguity is well encapsulated in the slight literal variation which separates the two terms 
commonly used to refer to it – resentment and ressentiment. Resentment has thus been 
given both a virtuous face, when it indicates a legitimate response to a perceived injustice; 
and vicious features, when it is engorged with metaphysical envy and narcissistic rage. 
Interestingly, recent political and IR theory has tended to subsume or fold the former into the 
latter, discussing resentment predominantly, if not uniquely, as ressentiment.17
In this paper I argue that there is value in redeeming the distinction between the resentment 
and ressentiment and in rescuing, as much as possible, the former from the relative 
hegemony of the latter. To do so, I investigate the way in which failures, specifically failures 
of justice, recognition and status – and the denial of such failures – provide the conditions of 
possibility for a globalisation of resentment and for the contemporary wave of terrorist 
violence. The first part of the paper reflects in general terms on failure in International 
Relations (IR). In particular, it investigates the claim made by a number of scholars, from 
Ulrich Beck to Wendy Brown, according to which failure today is increasingly experienced at 
epistemological question of whether one can explain action out of emotion. For a strong defence of 
this possibility that invokes a narrative approach against the rationalist tradition of either negating 
emotions or adding them on as ad-hoc ‘variables’, see Peter Goldie, The Emotions: A Philosophical 
Exploration (Oxford: Oxford University Press), esp. 37-49. The question of how to link emotions to 
terrorism is further complicated by the fact that primary data about the emotional states of clandestine 
actors is obviously hard to trace or, sometimes, it is entirely unavailable due to the attacker’s own 
death. Interestingly, however, the internet and social media have potentially made this issue less 
crippling, by making a ‘digital ethnography’ of terrorism and its emotions possible. See Thomas 
Hegghammer, ‘Why Terrorists Weep: The Socio-Cultural Practices of Jihadi Militants’, The Paul 
Wilkinson Memorial Lecture, University of St. Andrews, 16 April 2015 and Ursula Lindsey, ‘The Ties 
That Bind’, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 30 November 2015.
15 Slavoj Zizek, On Violence (New York: Picador, 2008), 85-104. 
16 The definition is from Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2006), 40. Although terrorism studies have long emphasised the importance of psychological factors, 
research on emotions is still surprisingly scant. For a similar acknowledgement and an attempt to 
move things forward, see David Wright-Neville and Debra Smith, ‘Political rage: terrorism and the 
politics of emotion’, Global Change, Peace & Security 21, no. 1 (2009): 85-98; and Priya Dixit and 
Jacob L. Stump, Critical Methods in Terrorism Studies (London: Routledge, 2016), 196.
17 As illustrated in political theory, for instance, by the work of William Connolly and Wendy Brown 
(discussed infra) and, in IR, by Mustapha Kemal Pasha, ‘Western Nihilism and Dialogue: Prelude to 
an Uncanny Encounter in International Relations’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 
Millennium 39, no. 3 (2011): 683-699.
5the level of the individual. In considering how individuals cope with failure, the paper then 
turns its attention individual emotions as microfoundations of politics, and specifically 
contemporary terrorism. By drawing on classical and contemporary political theory, the 
second part of the paper examines the place of resentment in the affective and moral 
economy of the global age. The paper here teases out some of the key distinctions between 
resentment and ressentiment as emotions that respond to two different kinds of failures: 
failures of justice, on the one hand, and failures of recognition or status, on the other. The 
third part of the paper gestures at their contemporary configurations.
To illustrate the epistemic, normative and political relevance of my argument, the fourth part 
of the paper examines the case of the Paris terror attacks of 7 January and 13 November. 
Discerning whether resentment or ressentiment was at the heart of the attacks – the worst in 
recent European history – is crucial for a number of reasons. Attributing the attacks to 
resentment or ressentiment yields different ‘intelligence’ about the situation in which they 
occurred, enabling different epistemic insights.18 This has also important implications for our 
moral evaluations of the events. Finally, depending on whether we recognise the attacks as 
resentment or ressentiment, different responses will be required, appropriate and justified. 
Ultimately, by raising the issue of the moral value of resentment and ressentiment, the paper 
seeks to address the question of how to cope with failure in global politics: whether through 
emancipatory or non-emancipatory projects, whether through self-affirming or self-
sabotaging political practices.
Coping with Failure: Globalization, Immanence and Violent Individuation
If progress and emancipation arguably formed the double totem of Western modernity, 
failure constituted the ‘limit-situation’ which, to paraphrase Karl Jaspers, set modernity 
‘whirling’ and announced the coming of its crisis.19 Thinkers of late modernity such as Ulrich 
Beck, Zygmunt Bauman and Bruno Latour have, in recent times, concerned themselves with 
theorising politics and society as increasingly complex systems that can and often do fail.20 
The progressive inclusion, immanentization and ontologization of failure has thus drawn 
particular attention to the role of accidents, risks, contingencies and complexity in governing 
global societies – a trend which IR has quickly latched onto and which sits at the heart of its 
18 Here I apply Martha Nussbaum’s insights about the ‘intelligence of emotions’ as developed in her 
Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001),
19 Karl Jaspers, Man in the Modern Age (London: Routledge, 2014 [1933])
20 See Zygmut Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Cambrige: Polity Press, 2000); Ulrich Beck, World risk 
society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999); and Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Harvard: 
Harvard University Press, 1993).
6speculative, precautionary and new materialist turn.21 More recently, resilience has emerged 
as the paradigm most closely invested in considering failure as a ‘fact of life’ which must be 
welcomed, managed and successfully overcome. 
As critical IR scholarship has amply demonstrated, however, risk and resilience seem to 
function today as the preeminent rationalities of neo-liberal governance. ‘Neoliberal 
citizenship’, Mark Neocleus claims, ‘is nothing if not a training in resilience’.22 The rationality 
of resilience and the move towards an ontologization of risk, thus, descend from the 
injunction to cope with ‘what is’ and its failures – whatever these may be – without asking 
necessarily why these may be so. Questions concerning causes, consequences and 
responsibility are cast away as modernist and dualist relics, swallowed up by an ever-
encompassing flat and monist ontology that demands ‘its due’.23 Failures are less and less 
subjected to causal and moral analysis, while they are more and more considered as 
horizontal ‘entanglements’ to be sidestepped and managed, rather than solved in any 
meaningful way.24
The injunction to incessantly cope with and adapt to failure crucially applies not only to 
systems, societies and polities. As Michel Foucault presciently argued, this injunction trickles 
all the way down and ends up applying first and foremost to individuals.25 Beck claimed 
specifically that the tragic individualisation of late modernity flows directly from failure: ‘the 
individual must cope with the uncertainty of the global world by him- or herself. Here 
individualization is a default outcome of a failure of expert systems to manage risks. […] 
Sustaining an individual self of integrity in world risk society is indeed a tragic affair’.26 
Similarly, Bauman vividly portrayed the individual condition as one of extreme vulnerability to 
systemic failures and yet full responsibility for their costs. ‘The responsibility for resolving the 
quandaries generated by vexingly volatile and constantly changing circumstances is shifted 
21 For good examples, see Amoore, The Politics of Possibility; Luis Lobo-Guerrero, Insuring Security: 
Biopolitics, security and risk (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011); and Claudia Aradau, ‘Security That 
Matters: Critical Infrastructure and Objects of Protection’, Security Dialogue 41, no. 5 (2010): 491-514.
22  Mark Neocleus, ‘“Don’t Be Scared, Be Prepared’’: Trauma-Anxiety-Resilience’, Alternatives: 
Global, Local, Political 37, no. 3: 192.
23 Bruno Latour, Facing Gaia: Six lectures on the political theology of nature (unpublished draft, 2013), 
126 and Bruno Latour, ‘Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?’, Critical Inquiry 30 (2004), 225-48.
24 This critique takes inspiration from Kate Soper, ‘Realism, Humanism, and the Politics of Nature’, 
Theoria 98 (2001 ), 55-71.
25 See Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the 
Collège De France, 1978-79 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); and Nicholas Kiersey, ‘Everyday 
Neoliberalism and the Subjectivity of Crisis: Post-Political Control in an Era of Financial Turmoil’, 
Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, no. 4 (2011): 23-44.
26 See Ulrich Beck, ‘Living in the world risk society’, Economy and Society 35, no. 3 (2006): 336. See 
also, Ulrich Beck, World risk society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999) and Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth 
Beck-Gernsheim, Individualization: Institutionalized Individualism and its Social and Political 
Consequences (London: Sage, 2001). 
7onto the shoulders of individuals’. And again, ‘it is the individual’s lot and duty to pay [the] 
price, because […] no authoritatively endorsed recipes […] could be blamed in the case of 
failure’.27 This, however, creates the conditions for progressively alienated, frustrated and 
especially resentful individuals. As Wendy Brown has argued, individuals are at once 
saturated with human power and yet increasingly alienated from their capacity to truly act 
politically. ‘Starkly accountable, yet dramatically impotent’, the individual ‘quite literally 
seethes with ressentiment’.28 Thus, the way in which failures are rendered immanent, 
ontological and a matter of individual responsibility – rather than of political and normative 
concern – seems to generate particular emotional results, notably the rise of resentment 
and/as ressentiment.
The ‘affective turn’ in social and political theory has picked up on this need to investigate the 
affective sensibilities of our age, drawing due attention to the role of individual and collective 
emotions as microfoundations of politics.29 However, the IR literature has especially 
exhibited a residual preference for emphasising the collective, or ‘macro’ level, over the 
individual, ‘micro’ level. The rationale is clearly offered by the editors of a recent Forum on 
Emotions and World Politics: ‘unless one shows that emotions matter beyond a purely 
individual and private level, there is no ground to examine their relevance for global 
politics’.30 This, however, can be challenged on two accounts. To start with, taking Bauman 
and Beck’s arguments seriously means thinking about the level of the individual as 
increasingly central to the global politics late modern times. It is at this level that risks, 
contingencies, and failures are experienced and processed.31
Secondly, however, there is another sense in which individual emotions, especially varieties 
of resentment, matter; a further sense in which the individualisation of global politics may be 
defined as truly tragic. The failure, or loss, of states’ monopoly on legitimate violence is 
cascading into forms of contemporary violence that organise and reflect the individualised 
nature of global politics. As the recent wave of terrorist attacks testifies – from Anders 
Brevik’s 2011 attacks in Norway to, more controversially, the recent San Bernardino’s 
27 Zygmut Bauman, Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 3-
4. See also Liquid Modernity (Cambrige: Polity Press, 2000) and The Individualized Society 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001).
28 Wendy Brown, “Wounded Attachments,” Political Theory 21, no. 3 (1993): 402. See infra for a fuller 
investigation of Brown’s arguments on individualisation and ressentiment. For an insightful analysis of 
Brown’s theses, see Simon Glezos, ‘Brown’s Paradox: Speed, Ressentiment and Global Politics’, 
Journal of International Political Theory 10, no. 2 (2014): 148-68.
29 See infra, fn 7 and also James Jasper, ‘Emotions and the Microfoundations of Politics: Rethinking 
Ends and Means’, in Emotion, Politics and Society, eds. Simon Clarke, Paul Hoggett and Simon 
Thompson (New York: Palgrave, 2006).
30 Bleiker and Hutchinson, ‘Theorizing Emotions in World Politics’,, 499.
31 The revival of this perspective in IR is well illustrated by Daniel Jacobi and Annette Freyberg-Inan, 
Human Beings in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
8shootings – self-radicalisation is no longer exceptional, but increasingly frequent and 
possible.32 The terrorist movements of today, such as al-Qaeda and ISIS, rely on a diasporic 
and horizontal pool of volunteers who are often encouraged to act independently, sometimes 
under only the most tenuous direction.33 As noted by a number of scholars, if there is a 
thread common to the latest wave of terrorist attacks, it is arguably the way in which 
personal resentments resonate with and are embedded in larger political narratives and 
grievances which are today global in scope.34
Personal resentments can actualise, resonate and reverberate with collective ones. Thus, 
resentment towards the failure of multiculturalism, integration and assimilation has regularly 
been combined with personal resentments in the justification of the terror of recent attacks.35 
Resentment linked to the perceived humiliation of Arabs and Muslims at the hands of 
Westerners, especially the US, since 9/11, provides another important dimension.36 As 
Jessica Stern has recently noted concerning ISIS, the ‘narrative of victory most appeals to 
32 The role of social media in this process can hardly be overestimated. See Cristina Archetti, 
Understanding Terrorism in the Age of Global Media: A Communication Approach (New York: 
Palgrave, 2012). On San Bernardino, see the recent reportage by William Finnegan, ‘Last Days’, New 
Yorker, 22 February 2016.
33 ‘Research suggests [that] pressure from security services forces a tactical adaptation and groups – 
including Daesh […] – call on those who share their ideology to act alone without direction or support’; 
in Raffaello Pantucci, ‘Lone-Actor Terrorism: Literature Review’, Rusi Occasional Paper (London, 
2015), 1. For the larger debate, see Barak Mendelsohn, The al-Qaeda Franchise: The Expansion of 
al-Qaeda and Its Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Marc Sageman, Leaderless 
Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2008); Karin Knorr Cetina, ‘Complex Global Microstructures: The New Terrorist Societies’ in Theory, 
Culture & Society, 22, no. 5 (2005): 213-234. 
34  Despite noticeable strategic, operational and generational differences, al Qaeda and ISIS are 
similar in the way their narratives weave the personal and social plane together. See Ramon Spaaij, 
Understanding Lone Wolf Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations and Prevention (New York: 
Springer, 2012) and Raffaello Pantucci, ‘A typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary analysis of Lone 
Islamist terrorists’, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence 
(London, 2011).
35 For instance, in the case of Mohammed Merah, the so-called ‘Toulouse bomber’, who spoke to 
France24 about his resentment against the agents of the French army, who had rejected his 
application a few months before the attack, and against the new French legislation banning women 
from wearing the full Islamic veil. See France24, ‘“Gunman” calls FRANCE 24 hours before pre-dawn 
siege’, 22 March 2012 and The Guardian, ‘Mohamed Merah: polite neighbour who was turned down 
by French army’, 21 March 2012. For a broader perspective, see Christopher Hill, The National 
Interest in Question: Foreign Policy in Multicultural Societies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 
and Shane Brighton, ‘British Muslims, multiculturalism and UK foreign policy: “Integration” and 
“Cohesion” in and beyond the State’, International Affairs 83, no. 1 (2007): 1–17.
36 Khaled Fattah and K.M. Fierke, ‘A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of Humiliation and Political 
Violence in the Middle East’, European Journal of International Relations 15, no. 1 (2009): 67-93; Paul 
Saurette, “You Dissin Me? Humiliation and Post 9/11 Global Politics,” Review of International Studies 
32, no. 03 (2006): 495-522; and E. G Lindner, “Humiliation as the Source of Terrorism: A New 
Paradigm,” Peace Research 33, no. 2 (2001): 59–68. While the focus of this paper is on Islamic 
terrorism, a victimary narrative of humiliation is also arguably common to some attacks of non-Islamic 
nature, for instance that perpetrated by Anders Breivik in Norway in July 2011 in the name of a 
Christendom under attack and humiliated by Islam. See Elisabetta Brighi, ‘The Mimetic Politics of 
Lone-Wolf Terrorism’, Journal of International Political Theory 11, no. 1 (2015): 145-64.
9those who feel they have lost something’.37 In identifying themselves as ‘the brothers who 
have refused to live a life of humiliation’,38 ISIS frames the movement’s grievances in terms 
of an aspirational parable that turns failure into success, loss into the recovery of dignity. 
Finally, the contemporary wave of terrorist attacks mobilises the much deeper and trans-
historical reservoir of resentment felt towards colonialization and imperial histories. This 
becomes clear if one considers that ISIS presented the breaking of the borders created by 
the 1916 Sykes-Picot treaty between Syria and Iraq as one of their greatest victory and 
indeed the symbolic moment of establishment of the caliphate.39 Additionally, the fact that at 
least three of the Paris attackers were of Algerian descent has been noted as being arguably 
significant.40 
While the main theoretical preoccupation of today seems to be how to sidestep, handle and 
overcome the effects failure through resilience and risk management, the move to make 
failure immanent and ontological only succeeds in pushing failure (and its real effects) down 
to the level of the individual. The micropolitics of affect that presides over the ways in which 
failure is processed, blame and responsibility are attributed, shame and humiliations are 
handled, and resentments are articulated thus becomes crucial. This is especially important 
at a time of increasing and violent individuation. Resentment is the emotional plane around 
which failures experienced at the individual and global level convergence. A journey into its 
nature and place in the contemporary condition is thus required.41
37  Jessica Stern, ‘What Does ISIS Really Want Now?’, Lawfare, 28 November 2015, available at 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-does-isis-really-want-now (20 December 2015). Needless to say, 
this is articulated in response not only to the humiliating policies of the West, but to the multiple 
failures within political Islam and modernization of the Middle East. See Oliver Roy, The Failure of 
Political Islam (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1996).
38 A. M. Al-‘Adnani, ‘This is the Promise of Allah’, 29 June 2014, available at 
https://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/06/.
39 Pieter Van Ostaeyen, ‘The Islamic State Restores the Caliphate’, 29 June 2014, available at 
https://pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/06/.
40 See, for instance, Robert Fisk, ‘France’s unresolved Algerian war sheds light on the Paris attack’, 
16 November 2015 and Alec G. Hargreaves, ‘French Muslims and the Middle East’, Contemporary 
French Civilization 40, no. 2 (2015): 235-54.
41 Two important caveats are in order before proceeding further. A study into the origins and 
dimensions of resentment should be confused neither with a deterministic account of terrorism, nor 
with a justification of actions inspired by it. In terms of the former, scholarship has long accepted that 
terrorism is best understood in processual terms and as a contingency-ridden multi-causal 
phenomenon. See respectively, John Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism (London: Routledge, 
2005); Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind (London: Routledge, 2009); and Alex 
Schmid, ‘Root Causes of Terrorism: Some Conceptual Notes, a Set of Indicators, and a Model Root 
Causes of Terrorism’, Democracy and Security 1 (2005): 127–136. Not all resentful individuals 
become terrorists, after all. However, while this means that terrorism is a complex phenomenon that 
cannot be explained by a single cause or set of causes, this does not mean that resentment in 
causally unimportant. In terms of the latter, as a particularly heinous form of political violence, 
terrorism generates deep moral dilemmas – its legitimacy has been almost invariably been denied, at 
least until recently (see infra, fn. 88). In so far as it violently calls into question pre-given political 
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Resentment or Ressentiment? On the Moral and Political Status of a Global Emotion.
Resentment has a long history and a bad name. It is one of those negative emotions which, 
according to historians and philologists, have driven the movement of human development. 
The history of resentment can be considered as parallel to that of progress, if not a counter-
melody born from its very failures.42 In this history resentment has an ambiguous place – 
similarly to violence, it is deemed to be both a creative and a destructive force, a functional 
or dysfunctional attitude.43
In its positive incarnation, resentment is the guardian of justice.44 As a moral emotion, 
resentment is not only an appropriate individual response to failures of justice, but it is also 
an indispensable attitude to cultivate if an overall degree of fairness is to be maintained in 
society. The XVIII century Presbyterian theologian Joseph Butler considered resentment as 
an indispensable social bond holding society together, a ‘weapon’ whose function is to ‘to 
prevent and remedy […] injury, and the miseries arising from it’.45 Considering this sentiment 
orders and reveals ‘the presence of two worlds in one’ (Jacque Rancière, ‘Ten Theses on Politics’, 
Theory and Event 5, no. 3 (2009), p. 21), terrorism is often met with inevitable ambivalence.
42 Marc Ferro, Resentment in History (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010) and Bernardino Fantini, Dolores 
Martín Moruno, and Javier Moscoso (eds). On Resentment: Past and Present (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013). On casually discovering the literary work that arguably first 
described ressentiment, namely Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground, in February 1887 
Friedrich Nietzsche compared the book to a melody: ‘ein Stück Musik, sehr fremder, sehr 
undeutscher Musik; […] ein Geniestreich der Psychologie, eine Art Selbstverhöhnung des γνῶθι 
σαυτόν’ (‘a piece of music, very strange music, very un-German; a psychological stroke of genius, a 
cruel jibe of “know thyself”’). See CA Miller, ‘Nietzsche’s ‘Discovery’ of Dostoevsky’, Nietzsche 
Studien 2, no. 1 (1973): 202–257 and Walter Kaufmann, ‘Introduction’, in Kaufmann, Existentialism: 
From Dostoevsky to Sartre (London: Penguin, 1975).
43 A growing body of literature across moral philosophy, anthropology and political theory has 
reflected on terminological difference between resentment and ressentiment. See most recently, 
Michael Ure, ‘Resentment/Ressentiment’, Constellations 22, no. 4 (2015): 599–613; Didier Fassin, 
‘On Resentment and Ressentiment: The Politics and Ethics of Moral Emotions’, Current Anthropology 
54, no. 3 (2013): 249-267; Thomas Brudholm, Resentment’s Virtue: Jean Amery and the Refusal to 
Forgive (Temple University Press, 2008); and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, ‘The Dramas of Resentment’, 
The Yale Review 88 (2000): 89–100. The terminological distinction between resentment and 
ressentiment is not always used unambiguously, partly due to the difficulties of translating 
ressentiment in English without collapsing this into ‘straight’ resentment. For a puzzling example of 
such confusion, see Fassin, ‘On Resentment and Ressentiment’, 260. For an example of a carefully 
considered choice and an argument for a ‘third way’, see Brudholm, Resentment’s Virtue, esp. 12-13, 
101-03.
44 The positive role of negative emotions (such as resentment, anger, and rage) in justice is briefly 
explored in Aaron Ben-Ze'ev, ‘Are Envy, Anger, and Resentment Moral Emotions? Philosophical 
Explorations 5, no. 2(2002):148-154 and in two recent and so far unpublished works: respectively, 
Grace Hunt, ‘Affirmative Reactions: In Defense of Resentment’ (New York: The New School, 2012), 
unpublished PhD manuscript; Rupert Brodersen, ‘Rage, Rancour and Revenge: Existentialist Motives 
in International Relations’ (London: London School of Economics, 2014), unpublished PhD 
manuscript.
45 Joseph Butler, Fifteen sermons preached at the Rolls Chapel (Cambridge: Hilliard & Brown, 1827 
[1726]), viii quoted in Fassin, ‘On Resentment and Ressentiment’, 251-52. 
11
in the context of other moral virtues, such as charity and compassion, Butler concluded that 
resentment is needed precisely to allow injustices to be acknowledged and injuries to be 
punished, rather than merely forgiven or forgotten. In some circumstances, therefore, 
resentment is morally superior to charity. Although acknowledging its potentially beastly 
character, unsocial nature and violent potential, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam 
Smith painted a similarly positive picture of resentment. According to Smith, resentment 
functions as a necessary corrective to imbalances in justice and as that reparative 
mechanism which restores society to a state of harmony and fairness.46 Once restrained and 
tempered of any of its excesses, resentment becomes that ‘noble and generous’ feeling of 
indignation that inspires the sympathetic recognition of others and transforms a community 
of strangers into a community of moral agents bound by the same nomos.47 
The contemporary political philosophy of scholars such as Jeffrie Murphy, Margaret Walker 
and Robert Solomon follows on from these arguments, combining the insights from Adam 
Smith with a revived Aristotelian view of resentment and anger as morally justifiable and 
useful affects.48 Robert Solomon goes as far as to assert that, as ‘a passion of justice denied 
[…], resentment lies at the heart of democracy’.49 It is the emotional state which, more than 
any other sentiment, proves that we care about and are ‘committed to certain moral 
standards, as regulative of social life’.50 What is judged detrimental if not wholly 
questionable, in these authors’ view, is thus not the place of resentment within the moral 
order. Rather, it is the contemporary prejudice against negative emotions and the overriding 
fixation for ‘closure’ that places societies at fault when it prevents them from acknowledging 
and remedying injustices. Therefore, it is the absence of resentment in the face of injustice 
that should be denounced as immoral. There is virtue in resentment, in other words. As Jean 
Améry stated, there is virtue in the moral ‘vertigo’ of resentment that disrupts the moral order 
and prevents hasty attempts at reconciliation.51 It is only because of resentment that 
46 Strikingly, it is in Theory of Moral Sentiments that Smith uses for the first time the now well-known 
metaphor of the ‘invisible hand’, namely that self-regulating mechanism responsible for restoring 
harmony in markets or, as it happens, moral orders. In Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. Knud 
Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 215. 
47 ‘We admire that noble and generous resentment which governs its pursuit of the greatest injuries, 
not by the rage which they are apt to excite in the breast of the sufferer, but by the indignation which 
they naturally call forth in that of the impartial spectator’, in ibid., 30.
48 For a brief overview, see Brudholm, Resentment’s Virtue, 10-11.
49 Robert C. A Solomon, A Passion for Justice: Emotions and the Origins of the Social Contract 
(Addison-Wesley, 1990), 270.
50 Richard Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1994), 69.
51 Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, ‘The Dramas of Resentment’, The Yale Review 88 (2000): 89–100.
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injustices become ‘a moral reality’ and it is only through resentment that an entire 
community, including perpetrators of injustice, are ‘swept into the truth’.52
Amongst contemporary political philosophers, however, a much less positive understanding 
of resentment ordinarily circulates. This is due to the hegemony exercised by the 
Nietzschean reading of a quintessentially existentialist notion, that of ressentiment.53 While 
resentment is understood to denote a legitimate sense of anger, and a desire for justice in 
the face of an injury, ressentiment indicates the pernicious and self-defeating folding in of 
this emotion onto itself. Ressentiment is suspended, delayed or botched revenge. As a 
frustrated, ossified and ultimately generalised form of resentment, ressentiment plants itself 
in the psychic underground of the sufferer as a blunt arrow, kept in permanent tension by the 
pain or memory of humiliation, yet never released from the bow of desire.54 From there, 
according to Friedrich Nietszche and Max Scheler, ressentiment poisons the mind of those 
who suffer from it – like a wave on a rock, in a restless movement that blurs past and 
present, ressentiment recalls the injuries suffered; resentment, unconsummated and thus 
intensified, bounces back as re-sentment.55 What makes this emotion particularly corrosive, 
aside from its generic, permanent and ontological character, is a form of denial. Instead of 
recognising the value of what is desired, ressentiment involves on the one hand, the careful 
cultivation of a type of false consciousness predicated on the inversion of the value of what 
was originally desired and, on the other, the delusion of an idealized alternative world where 
the victim becomes the ruler, and suffering can finally cease.56
According to Max Scheler’s reading of Nietzsche’s ressentiment, the origin of this emotion 
are not failures of justice but failures of recognition or status, in particular the envy that 
derives from comparing oneself to others and resenting one’s inferiority. ‘Envy […] is the 
strongest source of ressentiment. It is as if it whispers continually: “I can forgive everything, 
but not that you are – that you are what you are – that I am not what you are – indeed that I 
52 Jean Améry, At The Mind’s Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its Realities 
(New York: Schocken, 1980), p. 70. On Améry, see also Brudholm, Resentment’s virtue and Hunt, 
‘Affirmative Reactions’.
53 Hunt, ‘Affirmative Reactions’, 71ff.
54 For a phenomenology of ressentiment, see Fyodor Dostoevsky, Notes from the Underground, 
trans. Natasha Randall (London: Canongate, 2012 [1864]), esp. 22. For a commentary on 
Dostoevsky’s novel as a portrait of a contemporary lone-wolf terrorist, see Brighi, ‘The Mimetic Politics 
of Lone-Wolf Terrorism’.
55 ‘The existence of ressentiment thus demonstrates the artificial nature of the separation between 
past and present, which exist one inside the other; the past becomes a present that is more present 
than the present’; in Ferro, Resentment in History, 128.
56 Victimary narratives are therefore central to ressentiment. For a comprehensive treatment of the 
mechanisms behind the construction of victimhood and its proliferation in global politics today, see 
Harald Wydra, Politics and the Sacred (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015), 178-224.
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am not you”’.57 Ressentiment is the affect that underpins the construction of scapegoats, the 
exercise of revenge, and the affirmation of a negative or inverted form of enjoyment. For the 
subject experiencing ressentiment, enjoyment comes more from the misfortunes of others 
than an increase in one’s well-being. Imposing one’s suffering on others through revenge 
therefore becomes a way of actualising one’s negative enjoyment.58
In classical and modern political theory, thus, resentment and ressentiment occupy very 
different places on the emotional spectrum. At an analytical level, the two emotions differ 
along a series of important dimensions – including the level of motives, diagnosis, attribution 
of blame, temporal frame, recommendations, and consequences. Thus, while resentment is 
preoccupied with injustice and is moved by moral grievances deriving from perceived failures 
of justice, ressentiment is concerned with inequality and fuelled by the envy deriving form 
perceived failures of recognition or status. To adopt Jon Elster terminology, while resentment 
is an emotion of interaction, ressentiment (like envy) is an emotion of comparison.59 
Resentment starts from an affirmation of rights. It demands reparation of wrongs in a 
commensurate and prompt way and is satisfied by the increase in one’s own well-being that 
follows that reparation. Ressentiment, on the other hand, starts from the perception of one’s 
impotence or lack of rights. It expresses itself as a generalised and non-specific desire for 
revenge, made more intense by the construction of scapegoats and cultivation of fantasies 
of vendetta. Its satisfaction ultimately comes more from the misfortunes of others than from 
an increase in one’s well-being. Thus, resentment and ressentiment point to two different 
kinds of failure (of justice; of recognition or status) and to two different ways of coping with 
failure.
If resentment can be deemed a political and moral emotion, the moral bases and political 
implications of ressentiment seem more problematic. However, how tenable are these stark 
distinctions in empirical reality? Are these truly incommensurable emotions, driven by 
57 Max Scheler, Ressentiment (New York: Shocken, 1972 [1912]), 52.  For a comparison of 
Nietzsche’s and Scheler’s rendering of ressentiment, see Nicholas Birns, ‘Ressentiment and Counter-
Ressentiment: Nietzsche, Scheler, and the Reaction Against Equality" in Nietzsche Circle (September 
2005), available at http://www.nietzschecircle.com/RessentimentMaster.pdf 
58 The readings of ressentiment given by Nietzsche and Scheler overlap yet also differ considerably – 
inter alia, in terms of the degree of emphasis laid on envy as the underlying motive of ressentiment 
and in terms of the possibility of channeling and venting ressentiment into revenge. As brilliantly 
argued in Brodersen, ‘Rage, Rancour and Revenge’,156-58, Nietzsche understands revenge to be 
exclusively in spiritual rather than actual terms, while in Scheler the possibility of actual revenge 
stems directly from the misplaced aggression of ressentiment. Contra Brodersen, however, I argue 
that one should not infer from this that Schelerian ressentiment equates to ‘simple’ resentment 
incorrectly named and, as such, is not real ressentiment. The tension of ressentiment is precisely the 
one that survives after its necessarily partial revenge is consummated. ESP as means to revenge 
become easier.
59 Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 141.
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different passions and seeking satisfaction in different ways, or are they overlapping, 
especially in the prevailing conditions of global politics today? Is the relation between 
resentment and ressentiment one of mutual exclusion or contamination? Lastly, if we are 
witnessing an epidemic of ressentiment, as some contemporary scholars argue, what does 
that say about the kinds of failure we are confronted with today?
Resentment and Ressentiment in Late Modernity
Rather than being exclusively private or merely physiological, emotions are social and 
cultural too – the psychic and affective landscape changing with the changing social and 
political condition.60 A number of theorists have reflected on the issue of whether the political 
and social conditions of late modernity at a time of rampant neoliberalism and incessant 
securitization promote emotions of resentment or ressentiment.
William Connolly’s writings on the politics of resentment are a particularly interesting case in 
point. Connelly’s concern with resentment stems from a long-standing interest in how to 
ground democratic societies in the ‘globalisation of contingency’ of late modernity on an 
egalitarian and pluralist ethos.61 While Connolly acknowledges that resentment and moral 
indignation arguably are ‘indispensable sources of energy and inspiration’ for the formation 
of new political subjects and social movements,62 he warns about the exclusions and 
excesses spawned in the process. Identity politics, in particular, is always potentially also a 
politics of resentment that deprecates, rages against, and ultimately punishes difference.63 
If the origins of resentment lie in the entanglements and paradoxes of identity and difference, 
for Connolly ressentiment is altogether ‘another matter’.64 Connolly, in particular, recognises 
two routes into ressentiment. The first relies on a Nietzschean reading of ressentiment and 
places the origins of this emotion outside of the immediate political fray, within a second-
order, metaphysical plane. Ressentiment is a form of existential resentment against 
60  Sigmund Freud, ‘Civilization and its Discontents’, in Civilization, Society and Religion: Group 
Psychology, Civilization and its Discontents and Other Works (London: Penguin Books, 1985), 388; 
Dan Zahavi, Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014); and, for a contemporary evaluation, see Iain Wilkinson, Anxiety in a ‘Risk’ Society 
(London: Routledge, 2001).
61 William E. Connolly, Identity\Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1991), The Ethos of Pluralization (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1995) and Pluralism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005).
62 William Connolly, ‘A World of Becoming’ in Alan Finlayson, Democracy and Pluralism: the Political 
Thought of William Connolly (Milton Park: Routledge, 2010), 228.
63 These may be inevitable in so far as identity and difference are mutually constituted and in so far as 
security is, at least to some degree, pursued in identity. ‘The multiple drives to stamp truth upon […] 
identities function to convert differences into otherness and otherness into scapegoats’ Connolly, 
Identity\Difference, 67. 
64 Connolly, ‘A World of Becoming’, 228. Cfr. also Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization, 213n17.
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‘mortality, time, and the world’ – against our finitude.65 The second route into ressentiment, 
however, is moral and political – and highlights the transition, rather than the opposition, 
between resentment and ressentiment. ‘Ressentiment is stored resentment that has 
poisoned the soul and migrated to places where it is hidden and denied’,66 ‘it can grow out of 
an accumulation of justified resentments’ and can get dangerously congealed and ‘encoded 
into the spirit of institutional life’, endangering pluralism.67 Thus, not all forms of ressentiment 
are without political or moral bases. The failure to acknowledge and respond to protracted 
grievances causes resentment to fester and escalate into ressentiment. The denial of failure, 
in other words, leaves the subject worse off than the experience of failure itself. This is not 
least true, as Gilles Deleuze has argued, because it consigns the subject to an emotion that 
is alienating and non-emancipatory. Far from being an active and positive mode of political 
action, ressentiment decomposes resistance and incapacitates contestation.68 Crucially, for 
Connolly the contemporary condition is one around which these two routes into ressentiment 
converge and ‘whirl together’.69
In her writings, Wendy Brown has similarly mobilised the concept of ressentiment to account 
for the particular character and formation of identities in late modernity.70 According to 
Brown, the contemporary subject is characterised by a condition of radical failure and diffuse 
envy. On the one hand, the failure to measure up to the idealised standard of the ‘middle 
class’. On the other, the envy experienced towards the model of the sovereign, liberal 
individual. The consequence is that the subject ‘seethes with ressentiment’,71 an emotion 
which appears to be a general and fundamental existential condition in the ‘plastic cage’ of 
late modern societies.72
Contemporary ressentiment, according to Brown, exhibits three main characteristics. First, 
the externalization and displacement of suffering, which involves the production of 
scapegoats: ‘a culprit responsible for the hurt, and […] a site of revenge to displace the hurt’ 
and the re-enactment, rather than the resolution, of injuries as they are distributed and 
65 William E. Connolly, ‘The Evangelical-Capitalist Resonance Machine’, Political Theory 33, no. 6 
(2005): 877.
66 Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization, 213, emphasis added.
67 Connolly, ‘A World of Becoming’, 228, 230.
68 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 57.
69 Connolly, ‘The Evangelical-Capitalist Resonance Machine’, 879.
70 Wendy Brown, “Wounded Attachments,” Political Theory 21, no. 3 (1993): 390–410, States of 
Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995) and 
Politics Out of History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
71 Brown, ‘Wounded Attachments’, 402.
72 Brown, States of Injury, 28.
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externalised to others.73 Second, a failure of the will: ‘identity structured by this ethos 
becomes deeply invested in its own impotence’, generating only a blunted critique of power 
and returning incessantly to its own narcissistic wounds, rather than finding ground for 
genuine self-affirmation.74 Third, the proliferation and sacralisation of the condition of victim. 
In noting the rise of victimary narratives and of a moralizing politics of recognition, Brown 
anticipates the coming of that ‘empire of trauma’ which anthropologists Didier Fassin and 
Richard Rechtman identify as being a constitutive cipher of the contemporary moral 
economy.75
This is a perspective also shared by the French-American theorist Réne Girard.76 Rivalry 
and envy, already normally present in human relations given their inevitably mimetic 
nature,77 seem to have escalated out of proportions in late modernity.78 The triumph of the 
very operating principles of liberal and capitalist societies, namely equality and the market, 
and their competitive effects are now amplified on a global scale.79 Furthermore, immanence 
and the loss of any transcendental points of reference consign humanity to give up its 
normative horizons and live and fight its battles mimetically, which means violently. Both 
principles operate on and multiply the occasions for comparisons and envy. This is further 
escalated by the fact that the promise of equality and wealth is frustrated by the reality of 
inequality and structural imbalances that are often simply denied by society. All resentments, 
therefore, are turned into ressentiment: questions of justice are ontologised, rendered 
horizontal and turned into mere questions of comparison, recognition and status. In 
resonance with Connolly and Brown,80 Girard states that 
73 Brown, ‘Wounded Attachments’, 401. A revenge, however, that often does not extinguish 
ressentiment. See infra, fn 58.
74 Brown, ‘Wounded Attachments’, 403. Heinz Kohut’s pioneering work on narcissism and violence is 
explored in Felicity de Zulueta, From Pain to Violence: The Traumatic Roots of Destructiveness 
(London: Whurr Publishers, 1993).
75 Didier Fassin and Richard Rechtman, The Empire of Trauma (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2009).
76 For introductions to Girard’s mimetic theory, see John Williams (ed.), The Girard Reader (New 
York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2003); Elisabetta Brighi and Antonio Cerella, ‘An 
alternative vision of politics and violence: Introducing mimetic theory in international studies’, Journal 
of International Political Theory 11, no. 1, 3-25; Elisabetta Brighi and Antonio Cerella, The Sacred and 
the Political (London: Bloomsbury-Continuum, 2016).
77 Nidesh Lawtoo, The Phantom of the Ego: Modernism and the Mimetic Unconscious (East Lansing: 
MSU Press, 2013).
78 See Réne Girard, Deceit, Desire and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure (Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966 and Violence and the Sacred (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1977).
79 See especially Stefano Tomelleri, Ressentiment: Reflections on Mimetic Desire and Society (East 
Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2015) and Scott Cowdell, René Girard and Secular 
Modernity (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013).
80 Although well worth pursuing, a more extensive comparison of the striking contrasts and overlaps in 
the political theory of especially William Connolly and René Girard is beyond the scope of the present 
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we live in a world where many people, rightly or wrongly, feel blocked, or paralyzed, 
in all aspirations, obstructed from achieving their most legitimate goals. Individual 
psychology inevitably ends up resenting this permanent frustration, and the need 
arises for a term that expresses this state of affair. […] The word ressentiment seems 
designed to play this role.81
As seen from this brief survey, in contemporary political theory the difference between 
resentment and ressentiment remains crucial in terms of its moral and political implications. 
And yet, 
the political conditions of late modernity seem to suggest a less stark juxtaposition of the two 
emotions, if not the blurring or superseding of one to the other. Firstly, the conditions of late 
modernity are such that both routes into ressentiment (metaphysical and political) burst wide 
open: the exposure to the contingency, the immanentisation of politics, and the 
contradictions of neoliberalism all invite ressentiment while they increasingly preclude the 
articulation of resentment. Secondly, the proliferation (in numbers) and intensification (in 
tone) of interpretative frames that encourage self-perceptions of victimhood and impotence 
all contribute to make ressentiment more acute. Thirdly and finally, the persistence of moral 
grievances stemming from failures of justice over time can transform these emotions 
alchemically into a deeply rivalrous forms of ressentiment. The protracted denial of failures 
of justice, in other words, leaves the subject reeling and prone to revenge, rather than the 
pursuit of reparation. In other words, the denial of failure is more dangerous than failure 
itself, not least because it abandons the subject to alienating, non-emancipatory and the self-
sabotaging emotion of ressentiment. However, if this is true, what are the consequences of 
this state of affairs when the possibility of violence is multiplied and the means of revenge 
become not just imaginary but actual? Is the current wave of global terrorism fuelled by 
resentment or ressentiment?
Resentment, Ressentiment and Terror: Paris and the World
On 7 January and again on 13 November 2015 Paris was struck by the worst terror attacks 
in its peacetime history. If one combines the fatalities from the attack at the Charlie Hebdo 
headquarters and Kosher supermarket carried out in January with the mass shootings at the 
Bataclan theatre, suicide bombings at the Stade de France, and shootings at the restaurants 
of the 10th and 11th arrondissment, which were all carried out in a coordinated fashion on 13 
paper. Such assessment could usefully start from Connolly’s own critical reading of Girard in The 
Ethos of Pluralization, 51-58.
81 Réne Girard, ‘Preface’, in Tomelleri, Ressentiment, p. ix-x.
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November, it is clear that these attacks represent the worst wave of terrorist violence on 
French soil since the anarchist wave of terror in 1890s and the series of Algeria-related 
attacks of the 1960s and 1990s.82 On both occasions, the attacks were perpetrated by 
European citizens – mostly French nationals of non-European descent, including Algerian 
and Moroccan – and claimed by ISIS, with the exception of the Charlie Hebdo headquarters 
killings, which were claimed by al-Qaeda in Yemen. All attackers were later revealed as 
having links, although loose and unstructured in some cases, to local jihadi groups in France 
and Belgium. A number of them are currently believed to have fought with ISIS in Syria and 
Iraq.83 The motivations voiced by the attackers linked their protest against the Charlie Hebdo 
cartoons to the treatment of Muslims in France, especially concerning the veil ban and 
discrimination by the police, to French and US involvement in Iraq, Syria and Mali.84
Immediately after the attacks, quite aside from the outpouring of public mourning, an 
uncomfortable debate started to emerge within public opinion, state authorities and 
intellectuals concerning three main questions: firstly, the possible motives of the attacks; 
secondly, what the attacks revealed about the state of French and global society; thirdly, 
how best to respond to them. My argument is that in navigating these questions, we are 
faced with the task of discerning whether resentment or ressentiment fuelled them. Further, 
this choice will have important consequences for how we can epistemically know, morally 
judge and politically respond to the attacks. To flesh out what is at stake, and on the strength 
of the distinctions teased out in section two and three of the paper, a number of first cut, 
discriminating questions can therefore be posed: can the Paris attacks be read as 
expression of legitimate resentment, motivated by a desire to rectify failures of justice, and 
even ‘necessary’ to reinstate fairness in society? Far from proving the attackers’ lack of 
commitment to certain moral standards, did the attacks provide a moral vertigo necessary to 
‘sweep us into the truth’ of otherwise invisible crimes and injustice, to paraphrase Jean 
Améry? Alternatively, were the attacks a form of revenge produced by a frustrated, 
82 For a historical perspective, see Walter Laqueur, A History of Terrorism (New York: Transactions, 
2001) and, for a history of Paris and terrorism, see Julian Bourg, ‘Paris in Terror: France’s Long 
History of Political Violence’, The Boston Review, 3 December 2015. 
83 For recent developments on the ongoing inquiry, see Rukmini Callimachijan, ‘ISIS Video Appears to 
Show Paris Assailants Earlier in Syria and Iraq, The New York Times, 24 January 2016 and ‘Who 
were the terrorists? Everything we know about the Isil attackers so far’, 20 November 2015. 
84 On the November attacks, see especially Scott Atran, ‘Mindless terrorists? The truth about Isis is 
much worse’, The Guardian, 15 November 2015; Jürgen Habermas, ‘Le djihadisme, une forme 
moderne de réaction au déracinement’, Le Monde, 21 November 2015; Adam Shatz, ‘Magical 
Thinking about Isis’, The London Review of Books 37 no. 23 (2015): 11-14. On the Charlie Hebdo 
attacks, see Zygmunt Bauman, ‘The Charlie Hebdo Attack And What It Reveals About Society’, Social 
Europe, 13 January 2015; Olivier Roy, France’s Oedipal Islamist Complex’, Foreign Policy, 7 January 
2015; Etienne Balibar, ‘Trois mots pour les morts et pour les vivants’, Liberation, 9 January 2015. A 
vast bibliography on the Paris attacks has been compiled by the French Colonial Historical Society 
and is available as ‘#Parissyllabus’ at http://frenchcolonial.org/index.php/pedagogy-resources. 
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misdirected and generalised resentment better understood as ressentiment? Was radical 
envy as a result of perceived inferiority, rather than a sense of justice, at the heart of these 
attacks – an envy only magnified by exclusionary victimary narratives? Were the attacks a 
reflection of perceived impotence, rather than power, and the expression of a narcissistic 
fantasy aimed at violently inverting a negative power differential, rather than rectify specific 
wrongs? Finally, did the attacks manifest a mixture of the qualities above and how, if at all, 
can we make sense of any overlaps? 
Although left implicit, the conceptual pair of resentment and ressentiment, with their related 
questions, was arguably key in driving the debate that followed the attacks. 
Thus, while they didn’t justify the attacks, a number of intellectuals attributed moral and 
political significance to them. For instance, the French sociologist Emanuel Todd read the 
events firstly, as proof of resentment deriving from a reality of deep injustice and 
discrimination; and, secondly, as providing important insights about the French the social 
and political situation, dominated by an Islamophobic middle-class and a myopic defence of 
the principle of freedom of speech. The recognition, rather than denial, of grievances formed 
part of the only possible political solution.85 On the other hand, the position which prevailed 
in both French and British governments attributed no political or moral significance to the 
attacks. Attempts to understand the causes of the attacks amounted to mere ‘sociological 
excuses’ and thus a worthless endeavour.86 Rather, the attacks were interpreted as a 
mindless vendetta, with no relation to issues of justice but part of a delusional plan fuelled by 
rancour and envy – bearing the hallmark, in other words, of ressentiment. No insights were 
to be gained from the attacks, if not the increased need for robust counter-terrorist policies 
against ‘enemies’ – a ‘fascist’ ‘death cult’87 – rather than political actors.
The use of political violence by non-state actors has always historically generated great 
moral ambivalence and political polarisation. Of all types of political violence, terrorism was 
until recently the one traditionally considered not only the most contentious, but invariably 
85 See Emmanuel Todd, Who is Charlie? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015) and The Guardian, 
‘Emmanuel Todd: the French thinker who won't toe the Charlie Hebdo line’, 28 august 2015, available 
at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/aug/28/emmanuel-todd-the-french-thinker-who-wont-toe-the-
charlie-hebdo-line.
86 See Le Monde, ‘Manuel Valls: “Non, la France du 11 janvier n'est pas une imposture”’, 7 May 2015, 
available at http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2015/05/07/manuel-valls-nous-devons-resister-au-
pessimisme-ambiant_4629245_3224.html and Xavier Molénat, ‘La sociologie excuse-t-elle les 
terroristes?’, AlterEcoPlus, 1 December 2015, available at http://www.alterecoplus.fr/en-direct-de-la-
recherche/la-sociologie-excuse-t-elle-les-terroristes-201512011020-00002614.html.
87 The Guardian, ‘Hilary Benn makes emotional plea for Britain to bomb Isis ‘fascists’ in Syria’, 3 
December 2015, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/02/william-hague-breaks-
with-cameron-over-use-of-ground-forces-in-syria. 
20
the most illegitimate.88 It is unsurprising therefore that the double attacks in Paris generated 
such stark responses. However, if we now return to the questions raised above, to what 
extent can we see traces of resentment or ressentiment in the attacks?
It would be hard not to recognise that the violence seen in Paris demonstrated once again 
the power of resentment and that terrorism should be understood as a particularly dramatic 
‘power to make resentment felt’.89 Genuine resentment towards a specific set of issues was 
after all expressed in the statements and testimonials left by the attackers, all too often 
casually dismissed in the media as ‘bizarre rants’.90 These manifested the degree of anger 
ad extreme unease towards three specific sets of issues: the limits of multicultural integration 
and the conditions of Muslims in France; the failures, excesses and crimes of post-9/11 
Western interventions in the Middle East; the uncomfortable legacy of colonial history. As 
painful reminder of how these issues remain unresolved, resentment and the violence that 
this generates can hold up a mirror to societies often too tempted to achieve ‘closure’ 
prematurely and unfairly, if not deny failure altogether. As recognised by Adam Smith and 
Joseph Butler, more than reconciliation or forgiveness it is the expression, rather than denial, 
of this resentment and its sympathetic recognition by others that potentially turns a 
community of strangers into a community of moral agents bound by the same nomos. 
As Connolly warns, however, the more this process of recognition is delayed or stalled, the 
higher the likelihood that such resentment may fold in onto itself, ossify and re-present itself 
as ressentiment. When ressentiment takes over, justice leaves the scene and revenge takes 
over – the aim of depriving and making others suffer becomes more important than affirming 
one’s worth. Depriving innocent civilians of life and the enjoyment theoreof, as happened in 
Paris, constitutes a powerful clue of a resentment turned ressentiment. And yet, a few 
questions should make us hesitate before reaching any definitive conclusions. After all, the 
persistence of grievances can hardly make the same grievances illegitimate. Further, it is 
88 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 2006), C.A.J. Coady, ‘The Morality 
of Terrorism’, Philosophy 60 (1985): 47–69 and Robert E. Goodin, What's Wrong With Terrorism? 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2006). This has recently started to change. See, Uwe Steinhoff, ‘How Can 
Terrorism Be Justified?’, in Igor Primoratz (ed.), Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues (Palgrave: 
Basingstoke, 2004), 139-156 and Christopher Finlay, Terrorism and the Right to Resist: A Theory of 
Just Revolutionary War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
89 Baier, ‘Violent Demonstrations,’ 54.
90 During the siege at the Kosher supermarket, one of the January attackers, Amedy Coulibaly, voiced 
resentment in these terms: ‘Stop attacking the Islamic State, stop unveiling our women, stop putting 
our brothers in prison for everything and anything. […] You’re the ones who elected your 
governments. Firstly, the governments never hid their intentions to be at war in Mali or elsewhere. […] 
Secondly, it is you who is financing (the government). You pay taxes’. When one of the hostages 
replied that paying taxes is an obligation, Coulibaly replied: ‘You do not have to. I do not pay taxes’. 
See ‘Paris shootings: Listen to terrorist Amedy Coulibaly’s bizarre conversation with hostage during 
supermarket siege’, Daily Mirror, 10 Jan 2015 and ‘Radio station releases extracts of terror suspect’s 
rant’, ITV News, 10 January 2015.
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sufficient to look at the history of terrorism to know that the killing of innocent lives has been, 
at times, the only way to have grievances finally addressed.91 At the very least, then, 
Connolly’s two routes into ressentiment conflate situations that have rather distinct moral 
characteristics. More generally, the stark analytic distinction between resentment and 
ressentiment erodes the more a case mixes elements of the two.
And yet, there is an additional way in which the face of ressentiment may be recognisable in 
the attacks. Slavoj Zizek advanced a reading of the Charlie Hebdo attacks that provides an 
interesting account of the role of envy in the confrontation between Islamic terrorists and the 
West.
Do the [Charlie Hebdo terrorists] really fit this description [of fundamentalists]? What 
they obviously lack is a feature that is easy to discern in all authentic 
fundamentalists, from Tibetan Buddhists to the Amish in the US: the absence of 
resentment and envy. […] The problem is not cultural difference (their effort to 
preserve their identity), but the opposite fact that the fundamentalists are already like 
us, that, secretly, they have already internalized our standards and measure 
themselves by them. Paradoxically, what the fundamentalists really lack is precisely 
a dose of that true ‘racist’ conviction of their own superiority.92
Rather than demonstrating a ‘clash of civilisations’ and a desire to assert irreconcilable 
differences, in Zizek’s account the encounter between Islamic terrorists and the West seems 
to function according to a hyper-mimetic and imitative logic, which is the logic of envy and 
ressentiment. Envy is here to be understood less in patronizing terms and more as the 
inevitable loss of self-dignity which Frantz Fanon vividly described in the colonized – who 
lived across from the spectacle of colonial modernity, ‘felt robbed of all of these things’ and 
yet could only measure themselves by the master’s own standards.93 It is the relentless 
comparison and frustrated desire of identity, rather than difference – including religious 
difference – that fuels ressentiment and its violent expressions. 
This, however, can hardly be understood as a condition exclusive to terrorists. The flattening 
of relations and the refusal of any verticality makes failure immanent and ontological; this 
risks turning issues of justice into a mere envy-generating competition over status. As the 
paper has illustrated, a number of scholars converge in identifying this as the increasingly 
91 As Frantz Fanon put it in reference to Algeria’s Front de Libération Nationale, France only listened 
when ‘the knife was at its throat […] when confronted with greater violence’. Frantz Fanon, The 
Wretched of the Earth (London: Penguin, 2001 [1961]), 48.
92 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Are the worst really full of passionate intensity?’, The New Statesman, 10 January 
2015, emphasis added, available at http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/2015/01/slavoj-i-ek-
charlie-hebdo-massacre-are-worst-really-full-passionate-intensity 
93 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 58
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global condition under the spell of a failed or ‘fake egalitarianism’, and on the verge of an 
‘uncontrollable explosion of ressentiment’.94
If the Paris double attacks of 2015 teach us anything, therefore, it is that today it is 
imperative to resist conflating resentment and ressentiment and, instead, rescue as much as 
possible the former from the latter. Just as we need to avoid narrowing failure down 
conceptually to the mere management of its effects, we must resist any excessive 
infatuations with immanence that precludes the possibility of normative standards. By the 
very same token, it is imperative to reclaim those moral and political emotions that are able 
to render failure once again political, rather than just contingent, steering us away from the 
moral and political morass of late modernity.95
Privileging resentment over ressentiment, however, makes demands on ourselves. First, it 
asks us to go against powerful environmental stimuli that are currently converging to create 
ressentiment as our sovereign mode of being. Secondly, it expects us to be incessantly 
aware of our own nature and limitations as deeply imitative subjects, prone to envy and 
narcissism. Thirdly, it demands that we build societies able to cultivate resentment, rather 
than ressentiment, and able to denounce failure rather than embrace resilience, so that we 
can feel – and feel more deeply – a sense of moral outrage on behalf of others and their 
grievances. 
94 Paul Bowman and Richard Stamp (eds.), The Truth of Žižek (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 
2007), 228, 231.
95 On what moral philosophy and political theory should this more positive notion of resentment be 
founded on and channelled into is an important question that unfortunately exceeds the scope of this 
paper. Pace Hunt, ‘Affirmative Responses’, whether Nietzsche’s philosophy of ressentiment can still 
provide such a frame of reference seems, however, debatable.
